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special report
Swallows Holding as It Is:
The Distortion of National Muffler
IV.

By Steve R. Johnson
Steve R. Johnson is the E.L. Wiegand professor,
William S. Boyd School of Law, at the University of
Nevada, Las Vegas. The author invites comments at
steve.johnson@unlv.edu.
In Swallows Holding Ltd. v. Com1nissioner, a reviewed
opinion in early 2006, the Tax Court invalidated a
regulation involving return filing by certain foreign
corporations. The case is now on appeal to the Third
Circuit. Johnson believes that the Tax Court's decision
is wrong because it misread the precedents on which it
relied and misperceived the roles of Treasury and the
courts in filling gaps Congress left in tax statutes.

•

In this article, Johnson maintains that the Tax Court
misapplied the standard on which it relied: the National Muffier line of cases on deference to tax rules and
regulations. In a planned future article, Johnson will
maintain that the Tax Court failed to appreciate the
teaching of the Supreme Court in the Chevron and
Brand X cases. According to Johnson, either on National Muffler grounds or on Chevron and Brand X
grounds, the' Swallows Holding decision should be
reversed.

The author thanks Bryan Camp and Annette Mann
for their assistance.
Copyright 2006 Steve R. Johnson.
All rights reserved.
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I like big ideas. The opportunity to work with them,
and hopefully to add to them, is one of the joys of
academic life. But perspective also is required. Not
everything genuinely presents "macro" issues. 1 As Freud
supposedly said, "Sometimes a cigar is just a cigar."
In Swallows Holding Ltd. v. Commissioner, 2 the Tax
Court, over three dissenting opinions, invalidated a
return-filing timing rule in a Treasury regulation under
section 882 of the !RC. It is clear that what drove the
majority opinion was the perception that the timing rule
was contrary to many previous cases interpreting the
statute. 3 As I read the majority and dissenting opinions,
the prospect of writing about great issues danced in my
head: matters such as (1) the relationship between Chevron" and competing standards of deference, 5 and (2) the
significance for tax law of the Supreme Court's Brand X
decision, 6 dealing with when administrative rules may
displace prior case law.
However, when I read the cases on which the Swallows
majority relied, the need for a "plan B" became apparent.
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As the Supreme Court has warned in the context of statutory interpretation, one should avoid the temptation to find
"elephants in mouseholes." V\Thitman v. American Trucking Ass'n,
Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001).
2
126 TC. 96, Doc 2006-1541, 2006TNT18-10 (2006). On July 5,
2006, the IRS filed its notice of appeal in this case to the Third
Circuit.
3
See id. at 137 (denouncing Treasury's promulgating the
regulation "with total disregard to firmly established judicial
precedent") and 148 (objecting to Treasury's "attempts to circumvent longstanding judicial decisions").
-!Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837 (1984).
5
Judge Mark V. Holmes was thinking along those lines, too.
His dissent offered the hope that the case may "be a good
vehicle for appellate guidance on whether National Muffler
continues to be in good working order after Chevron, Mead, and
Brand X." Id. at 163-164.
6
National Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs.,
125 s. Ct. 2688 (2005).
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When those cases are carefully analyzed, the perceived
tension benveen them and the regulation disappears.
Indeed, understood in the context of the proper roles of
the courts and Treasury, the cases actually support the
validity of the regulation. As a re,ult, Swallows does not
present the "regulation versus case law" conflict that
would sharpen Brand X and Chevron issues. Yet Swallows
remains an interesting and important case,7 particularly
because, in my opinion, the Swallows majority distorted
the National Muffler' standard, converting it from a shield
of deference to a sword of invalidation.
Accordingly, I will write two Swallows reports. This
report, the first, treats the decision as it is. It explains why,
given the compatibility of the regulation and the prior
cases, S1Dallou1s was wrongly decided and should be
reversed. This article also attempts to bring National
Muffler back from the diversion it was taken on by
Sumllows. A future article will treat Swallows not as it is
but as the Tax Court majority viewed it. That is, the
second article will assume that the regulation is inconsistent with the prior cases. That assumption will allow
exploration of Chevron and Brand X issues.
This article has five main parts. Part I describes
Szva1Iou1s. The case for reversal of Swallows rests on
propositions which are developed in Parts II, IJI, IV, and
V. Part II shows that, properly understood, the previous
cases held that some timing requirement for the filing of
returns is implicit in the governing statute. Therefore, the
only questidn is one of line-drawing: where to draw the
line between permissibly tardy returns and impermissibly tardy returns.
Part IJI notes that Congress did not instruct where the
timing line was to be drawn. It left a gap to be filled.
Line-drawing under an implicit delegation is a matter for
Treasury and the IRS, not for the courts. Part IV demonstrates that the line drawn by the regulation is reasonable. It effectively furthers the purpose behind the statute; it responds to a genuine need in the orderly
administration of the tax laws; and it is indulgent toward,
not burdensome for, taxpayers. All that being so, the
regulation at issue should be upheld.
Part V particularizes the analysis under National Muffler and the other cases of its line. Part V establishes that,

7
Commentary about Swallows thus far includes Jasper L.
Cummings, Jr., "Tax Court Decision Demonstrates Uncertainty
in Standard of Review for Interpretive Versus Legislative Regulations," 25 Tax Man. Weekly Rep. 585 (2006); Craig W. Friedrich,
''Late Filing Foreign Corporation Does Not Forfeit Deductions;
Contrary Regulation Invalidated," Corp. Tax'n, May /June 2006,
at 44; Richard M. Lipton, "A Divided Tax Court Rejects a
Regulation - and Struggles With Administrative Law - in
Swallows Holding," 104 J. Tax'n 260 (2006); Kathryn). Morrison,
"Are Timely Filed Returns a Prerequisite for Foreign Corporation Expense Deductions?" ABA Section of Taxation NewsQuarterly, Summer 2006, at 9; W. Eugene Seago and Edward J.
Schnee, "The Tax Court Salvages a Foreign Corporation's Deductions in Swallows Holding," Corp. Tax'n, May /June 2006, at
20; Lee A. Sheppard, "Tax Court Flunks the Brand X Test," Tax
Notes, Feb. 6, 2006, p. 585.
8
National Muffler Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472

(1979).
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although that line of cases is deferential toward tax
regulations, the approach of the Swallows majority was
closer to a hard look than to deference. When National
Muffler is properly applied deferentially, upholding the
regulation should not be problematic.
I. Swallows

A. Facts
The taxpayer was a foreign corporation that owned
real property in the United States. The corporation was
on a fiscal year ending on May 31. The tax years at issue
were 1994, 1995, and 1996. The due dates for those
returns were November 15 of 1994, 1995, and 1996,
respectively. 9 The corporation did not file those returns
until July 23, 1999. However, the corporation had not
been contacted by the IRS about the delinquent returns,
nor had the IRS prepared substitutes for those returns.
The corporation was treated as having elected to treat its
U.S.-source income as effectively connected with a U.S.
trade or business. 10 The corporation's deductions for the
years at issue substantially exceeded its income. The IRS
disallowed the claimed deductions and asserted deficiencies. The corporation filed a Tax Court petition.
Section 882(c)(2) provides that a foreign corporation
with effectively connected income can claim deductions
"only by filing ... a true and accurate return, in the
manner prescribed in subtitle F, including therein all the
information which the [IRS] may deem necessary for the
calculation of such deductions." That requirement entered the law in 1928 and has been reenacted many times
without essential change. 11 Subtitle F contains the procedural sections of the code, including section 6072, which
prescribes when income tax returns are to be filed.
Regulations were promulgated in 1957, nearly 30
years after enactment of the original predecessor of
section 882. The regulations were amended in 1990 and
again in 2002 and 2003. 12 The timing rule at issue in
Swallows emanated from the 1990 amendments. Those
amendments were first proposed in July 198913 and were
finalized in December 1990, effective for tax years ending
after July 31, 1990. 14 Before being finalized, the amendments went through the familiar notice-and-comment
process. 15
The 1990 amendments set out timing rules for foreign
corporations in reg. section 1.882-4 and broadly similar

•

•

9
Usually, a corporation must file its income tax return by the
15th day of the third month after the close of its tax year. Section
6072(b); reg. section 1.6072-(a). However, foreign corporations
without an office or place of business in the United States (such
as the Swallozvs taxpayer) may file up to the 15th day of the sixth
month after the close of the year. Section 6072(c); reg. section

l.6072-2(b).
10
126 T.C. at 97; see section 882(d)(l).
11

The statutory history is recounted at 126 T.C. at 107-111.
The regulatory history is recounted in id. at 125-129.
13
54 Fed. Reg. 31545 (July 31, 1989).
14
T.D. 8322, 1990-2 C.B. 172, 55 Fed. Reg. 50827-01 (Dec. 11,
1990), corrected at 56 Fed. Reg. 1361-01 (Jan. 14, 1991) and 56 Fed.
Reg. 5455-07 (Feb. 11, 1991).
15
See proc. reg. section 601.601; 1Rlv1 30(15) and 32.1.5.
12
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timing rules for nonresident alien individuals in reg.
section 1.874-1. Under the amended regulation, a foreign
corporation may avail itself of otherwise allowable deductions and credits for the year only if it files its federal
income tax return by a specified time. 16
The rules defining the specified date or terminal date
include complexities and special rules unnecessary to
explore for Swallows purposes. 17 In general, and as applicable to the Swallows taxpayer, for the corporation to be
allowed deductions, "the required return for the current
taxable year must be filed within 18 months of the due
date as set forth in section 6072 and the regulations under
that section, for filing the return for the current taxable
year."" For simplicity, I use the 18-month terminal date
throughout this article. It was the failure of the Swallows
taxpayer to file its 1994, 1995, and 1996 returns within the
18-month period that prompted the IRS to disallow the
deductions claimed for those years.
Finally, as relevant here, the 1990 regulation allows the
IRS to waive the 18-month requirement for good cause,
based on the facts and circumstances, if shown by the
foreign corporation. 19 It does not appear that the Swallows
taxpayer sought this waiver.

•

The taxpayer challenged the validity of the regulation,
leading to review by the full Tax Court. 20 The majority
opinion, invalidating the 18-month time limit in the
regulation, was authored by Judge David Laro, with 12
judges joining in the opinion and 2 judges concurring in
the result only. judges Stephen). Swift, James S. Halpern,
and Mark V. Holmes wrote dissenting op~ions .
B. Majority Opinion
Because the regulation in question was promulgated
under the g~neral authority of section 7805(a) and not
under specifi'c authority in section 882 itself, the regulation is an interpretive regulation. At least in theory,
interpretive regulations receive less deference than legislative regulations. 21 The Swallows majority identified National Muffler as the standard by which to assess the

validity of interpretive tax regulations. 22 In general, a
regulation is valid under that standard if it implements
Congress's intention in a reasonable manner, that is, if it
"harmonizes with the plain language of the statute, its
origin, and its purpose."23
The majority focused on six factors drawn from National Muffler: whether the regulation was substantially
contemporaneous with the statute, the manner in which
the regulation evolved, whether the regulation is of long
standing, reliance placed on the regulation, the consistency of the IRS's interpretation, and how much scrutiny
Congress gave the regulation during subsequent reenactments. 24
The majority concluded that the regulation failed
under those factors. For this article's purposes, two
aspects of the majority's analysis are particularly noteworthy: (1) the majority's "plain language" argument
based on prior cases construing the statute, and (2) the
majority's "legislative reenactment" argument.
First, the majority stated: "A plain reading of the
relevant text [of section 882(c)(2)] in the context of
the ... Code shows that the text includes no timely filing
requirement." 25 The statute does make filing a return "in
the manner prescribed by Subtitle F" a condition for
allowance of deductions. However, the majority held that
the "plain meaning of the word 'manner,' as used in the
relevant text, does not include an element of time." 26
Thus, when the regulation added a timing rule as to
returns, it impermissibly went beyond the statute.
Central to the majority's "plain meaning" argument
were the prior cases involving section 882(c)(2), substantially similar section 874(a), 27 and their predecessors. The
first case of this line was the Board of Tax Appeals'
(BTA's) 1938 Anglo-American decision. 28 The line included
eight other cases that were decided betwaen 1939 and
1996." The Swallows majority believed the regulation to

22
126 T.C. at 129-131. The majority added, however, that the
result it reached would have been the same had it applied
Chevron instead of National Muffl.er. ld. at 131.

23 440
16

Reg. section l.882-4(a)(2).

17

For a full statement of the rules, see re_g. section l.8824(a)(3); see also 126 T.C. at 135 n.17 (majority opinion) and

151-153 (Swift, )., dissenting).
18 Reg. section l.882-4(a)(3)(i). If no return has been filed for
the year immediately preceding the current year, the terminal
date is 18 months after the due date of the current year's return
or the date the IRS "mails a notice to the foreign corporation
advising the corporation that the current year tax return has not
been filed and that no deductions ... may be claimed by the

taxr,ayer." Id.
9
Reg. section l.882-4(a)(3)(ii).
2
°For description of the Tax Court's conference and review
procedures, see Harold Dubroff, The United States Tax Court: An
, Historical Analysis 352-360 (1979). Invalidation of a treasury
regulation is one of the situations that customarily triggers
full-court review by the Tax Court.
21
See, e.g., Rowan Cos., [nc. v. Con1missioner, 452 U.S. 247, 253
(1981). I say "in theory" because it is unclear that this difference
operates in fact, not just in rhetoric. This point will be explored
in the second article.

24

U.S. at 476-477.
126 T.C. at 136-137 (citing 440 U.S. at 477).

25

126 T.C. at 132.

26/d.

27
[n relevant respects, the section 874 rules as to nonresident
alien individuals parallel the section 884 rules concerning
foreign corporations, including conditioning deductions on
properly filed returns. Accordingly, the two sections are viewL·d
as in pari materia. E.g., id. at 112; Espinosa v. Commissioner, ! 07
TC. 146, 153, Doc 96-26161, 96 TNT 188-4 (1996).
28
Anglo-Am. Direct Tea Trading Co., Ltd. v. Commissioner, J.S
B.T.A. 711 (1938). The IRS issued a nonacquiescence to A11gfo-

American. 1939-1 C.B. (pt. 1) 39.
29
The cases are Mills, Spence & Co. v. Commissioner, 1938 VVl.
8403 (B.T.A. memo. 1938); American Inv. & Gen. Trust L"-i Co. t'.
Contmissioner, 1939 WL 12004 (B.T.A. memo. 1939); Taylor SeL'.,
Inc. v. Commissioner, 40 B.T.A. 696 (1939); Ardbern Co. r1. Co111111i .. ;
sioner, 120 F.2d 424 (4th Cir. 1941), modift;ing and re1111111di11g 011
other grounds, 41 B.T.A. 910 (1940); Blenheim Co. v. Co111111i::.::;io11('r,
125 F.2d 906 (4th Cir. 1942), affg 42 BT.A 1248 (1940); c,·"1·,/,111
Enter. v. Commissioner, 126 F.2d 384 (4th Cir. 1942), i~tf'x ! 9-Hl \VI
10265 (B.T.A. memo. 1940); Espinosa v. Con1n1issio11er, 107 re. l-~(1
(1996); [nverWorld, Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. !996-:'ltl I. 71
(Footnote continued on next p.1ge.l
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be inconsistent with those cases, although it did not
explain the perceived inconsistency with particularity. I
read the prior cases differently, as will be seen in Part IL
The other noteworthy aspect of the majority opinion is
its invocation of the legislative, reenactment doctrine.
Citing cases, the majority summarized the doctrine
thusly: "Congress is presumed to have known of the
administrative and judicial interpretations of a statutory
term reenacted without significant change and to have
ratified and included that interpretation in the reenacted
terrn." 3° Congress had reenacted, without essential
change, section 882 and its predecessors several times
after Anglo-American was decided. On that basis, the
majority concluded that Congress approved of that case
and the cases that came after it.
C Dissenting Opinions
I will recount only the portions of the dissents relevant
to this article. Judge Swift thought the prior cases were
distinguishable because the 1990 regulation was not at
play in them. 31 Thus, "the majority opinion fails to
properly distinguish the pre-1990 'no-regulation environment' of the cited court opinions from the environment
or authority that came into existence upon promulgation
[of the regulation] in 1990."32
Judge Holmes challenged the majority's conclusion
that the statute has an unambiguous meaning that excludes timing. He gave examples in both tax and contract
law in wl)ich the term "manner" has been seen as
including timing.33
Also, three points were common to two or all three of
the dissents. First, all three dissenters thought that the
majority misread the earlier cases. They concluded that
later cases modified Anglo-American and permit a timing
rule. 34 That point is developed in Part II below.
Second, Judges Halpern and Holmes concluded that
Chevron, not National Muffler, should provide the controlling standard and that the regulation is valid under

Chevron. 35
Third, Judges Holmes and Swift criticized the majority's legislative reenactment analysis. Judge Holmes pronounced himself "quite leery of the majority's formulation" of the doctrine, particularly "when it is used to
invalidate, rather than uphold, a regulation."36 The majority had added its formulation "for sake of complete-

T.C.M. (CCH) 3231, Doc 96-18802, 96 TNT 127-14. The cases are
discussed at 126 T.C. at 112-125.
30
126 T.C. at 139-142.
31 Most of the cases involved years before 1990. The regulation was in existence for some of the years at issue in Espinosa
and InverWorld. However, the Tax Court resolved those cases on
the basis of precedent, obviating the need to assess the validity
of the regulation. Espinosa, supra note 27, at 158; InverWorld,
supra note 29, at 3237-3255.
32
126 T.C. at 149.
33 ld. at 165-166. The tax examples are reg. section l.179-5(a)
implementing section 179(c) and reg. section 1.826-l(c) implementing section 835(c)(2).
34
126 T.C. at 150-151 Qudge Swift), 158-160 (Judge Halpern),
and 167-168 (Judge Holmes).
35
/d. at 157-162 (Judge Halpern) and 172-182 (judge Holmes).
36Jd. at 169 (emphasis in original).
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ness," 37 but the majority's formulation was itself incomplete. The legislative reenactment doctrine does not
apply "where nothing indicates that the legislature had
its attention directed to the administrative interpretation
upon reenactment."38 There are cases that invoke the
doctrine without establishing this predicate condition.
Nonetheless, the better view is that the doctrine either,
doesn't apply or carries little weight, absent legislative
awareness of the interpretation. 39 Thus, "the majority's
reliance on legislative reenactment should have ended
when it could find no affirmative evidence that Congress
knew of any of the [cases] which the majority had
invoked."40
Judge Swift also noted that the Tax Court had previously stated, "We do not believe that the legislative
reenactment doctrine can be applied to bar reasonable
amendments to regulations where ... the change is made
only prospectively from the date of the announcement of
the proposed~ change." 41 The 1990 regulation was prospective in that regard.

II. Prior Cases Support Some Timing Requirement
The Swallows majority misread the case law on which
it relied. Three tribunals - the BIA, the Tax Court, and
the Fourth Circuit42 - decided the nine prior cases. At
the end of the day, all three of those tribunals - far from
rejecting timing as a component of section 882 - agreed
that some timing aspect is implicit in the .statute.
The prior cases divide into two groups·: the first three
decisions and the later six decisions. As shown below, the
first group sent mixed signals and need not be read as
flatly prohjbiting any timing requirement. Even if the
first group were so read, however, the second group
effectively overruled that position and clearly embraced
the notion that some timing limitation is consistent with
the statute.

•

•

A. First Three Decisions
The BIA first considered the issue in the AngloAmerican case in 1938. 43 The foreign corporation did not

37Jd. at 139.
38 /d. at 155 (Judge Swift) (quoting 2B Norman J. Singer,
Sutherland Statutory Construction section 49:09 (6th ed. (2000)).
39
See, e.g., William D. Popkin, Materials on Legislation: Political
Lanfcuage and the Political Process 632 (4th ed. 2005).
0
126 T.C. at 170 Oudge Holmes).
41 Id. at 156 (quoting Wendland v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 355, 384
(1982), aftd sub nom., Redhouse v. Commissioner, 728 F.2d 1249 (9th
Cir. 1984)).
4
2For foreign corporations without a principal place of
business or principal office or agency in any U.S. judicial
district, venue for appeal of a Tax Court decision is determined
by reference to the IRS office where the corporation's returns are
filed. Section 7482(b)(l)(B). For the years involved in the early
cases, foreign corporations filed their returns with the collector
of internal revenue in Baltimore, which is why the Fourth
Circuit was the appellate court in those cases. For the years at
issue in Swallaws, foreign corporations filed their returns with
the IRS campus in Philadelphia, which is why Swallows is on
appeal to the Third Circuit. See 126 T.C. at 105-106 and n.9.
43Anglo-Am. Direct Tea Trading Co., Ltd. v. Commissioner, 38
B.T.A. 711 (1938).
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timely file returns for its 1932 and 1933 tax years. The IRS
discussed the matter with a corporate officer in March
1935. In April 1935, without informing the corporation,
an IRS agent prepared substitutes for returns (SFRs). 44
Before the commissioner had accepted the SFRs, the
taxpayer filed its delinquent returns. Under the predecessor of current section 882, the IRS denied the deductions claimed on those returns because the returns were
delinquent. The IRS's position appears to have been that
returns filed even one day after the due date precluded
claiming deductions. 45
The BTA, in a reviewed decision and without dissent,
rejected the IRS's position. The board defined "manner,"
which appeared in the statute then the same way as it
does now. The board acknowledged linguistic ambiguity.
It is true, as [the IRS] points out, that "manner" is a
comprehensive term, and includes, but is more
comprehensive than, "method, mode, or way." But
whether it is broad enough to include the element
of time is a more difficult question. In some instances it has been construed by courts as including
time; while in others it has been construed as not
including it. 46
Nonetheless, employing a "clear statement" approach," the BTA concluded that in the context of the
statute, "manner" did not include a time element. "If
Congress had intended to deprive a foreign corporation
of its right to deduct[ions] if it did not file its return
within the time prescribed, we think it would have said
so."48
However, the BTA stated its holding thus)y: "We hold,
therefore, that the mere fact that the return was not filed
within the time prescribed by [what is now code section
6072} does not, under the circumstances present here,
preclude the ~llowance of the deductions claimed." 49 The

44

There are two types of SFRs. One type is prepared by the
IRS from available information but is presented to, and is signed
by, the taxpayer. Section 6020(a). The other type is prepared by

the IRS but not signed by the taxpayer. Section 6020(b). The
SFRs discussed in this article are of the second type. For
discussion of some of the issues raised by SFRs, see Bryan T.
Camp, "The Function of Forms in the Substitute-for-Return
Process," Tax Notes, June 26, 2006, p. 1511.
45
See 38 B.T.A. at 713-714.
46
Id. at 714 (numerous cited cases omitted).
47
1£ a court dislikes a particular substantive result, a common
device is to declare something like "we will attribute to Con.gress an intention to produce that result only if the statute
contains a clear statement of that intention" and then to hold
that such a clear statement is absent from the statute. See
generally William V. Luneburg,- "Justice Rehnquist, Statutory
Interpretation, the Policies of Clear Statement, and Federal
Jurisdiction," 58 Ind. L.J. 211 (1982). For a recent Supreme Court
case making double use of the "clear statement" approach, see
Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208, 2224 (2006) (plurality
, opinion).
48
38 B.T.A. at 715. A later Tax Court case implicitly rejected
this rationale and held that this draconian deprivation is intended to have an in terrorem effect furthering Congress's
purpose of encouraging foreign corporations to file returns.
Espinosa v. Commissioner, 107 T.C. 146, 152, 157 (1996).
'°38 B.T.A. at 715.
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wording "under the circumstances present here" holds
out the possibility of a different result on different facts.
Moreover, the holding rejects only a time cutoff fixed at
the due date for the filing of the return. It does not reject
all possible more lenient cutoffs, such as the 18-month
period under the 1990 regulation.so By virtue of its
holding, therefore, Anglo-American need not stand for the
absolute proposition that no timing requirement whatsoever is permissible under what is now section 882(c)(2).
Anglo-American was followed in short order by two
BTA memorandum decisions: Mills and American Investment.51 In their essential facts, those cases resembled
Anglo-American, and the BTA resolved the cases in the
taxpayers' favor, citing Anglo-American but providing no
further analysis.
B. Six Subsequent Decisions
The three early decisions did not end the BTA' s
consideration of the issue. Slightly over a year after
Anglo-American, the BTA decided Taylor Securities. The
foreign corporation had not filed returns for tax years
1930 through 1935. In March 1937 the IRS issued a notice
of deficiency for the years based on SFRs. In June 1937 the
corporation filed a petition with the BTA. The IRS timely
answered. Hearing was set for December 5, 1938, but was
continued until January 16, 1939. The taxpayer filed the
delinquent returns on December 13, 1938.
The board distinguished Anglo-American because in
that case the returns had been filed before the deficiency
notice was issued, the returns had been audited, and the
commissioner had not accepted the SFRs. 52 "Nor did we
decide there the question raised on argument here
[which] is whether the [corporation], by filing returns
after the [commissioner] made his determination of deficiencies," satisfied the statutory condition for allowance
of the deductions. 53
,
In a reviewed decision (with two members concurring
on other grounds and three dissenting), the BTA resolved
this question in favor of the IRS. The board stated that,
under the statute:
the allowance to foreign corporations of the credits
and deductions ordinarily allowable is specifically
predicated upon such corporations filing returns. In
view of such a specific prerequisite it is inconceivable that Congress contemplated by that section
that taxpayers could wait indefinitely to file returns

50

Tue Swallows majority stated that the IRS "acknowledges
[that its position in Swallows] is the same as that rejected in
Anglo-Am .... and its progeny." 126 T.C. at 99. If the IRS did
make that concession, the concession was erroneous. Allowing
the taxpayer an 18-month grace period after the return due date
(the regulation) is considerably less burdensome on taxpayers
than allowing no post-due-date grace period (the IRS's litigating
position in Anglo-American). In any event, a regulation has
higher dignity than a litigating position. See ABA Section of
Taxation Report of the Task Force on Judicial Deference (here-

after ABA Deference Report), 57 Tax Law. 717, 758-759 (2004).
51
Mills, Spence & Co.,' Ltd. v. Commissioner, 1938 WL 8403
(B.T.A. memo. 1938); American Inv. & Gen. Trust Co., Ltd. v.
Commissioner, 1939 WL 12044 (B.T.A. memo. 1939).
32
Taylor Sec. Inc. v. Commissioner, 40 B.T.A. 696, 702-703 (1939).
53

ld. at 703.
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and eventually when the [IRS] determined deficiencies against them that they could then by filing
returns obtain all the benefits to which they would
have been entitled if their returns had been timely
filed. Such a construction wo11ld put a premium on
evasion, since a taxpayer would have nothing to
lose by not filing a return as required by the
statute. 54
It is not entirely clear whether the Taylor Securities
board adopted a fixed moment for when a return would
be too late, although a possible reading is that a return
filed after issuance of the notice of deficiency is too late.
What is clear, however, is that the BTA abandoned in
Taylor Securities what it may have said in Anglo-American.
The statute does contain a timing element, after all. At
some point, a return is filed too late, forfeiting otherwise
available deductions.
That teaching of Taylor Securities has remained the law
ever since, at least until Swallows. All post-Taylor Securities
cases confirmed that the statute implies some cutoff time.
The first cases confirming that were Ardbern, Blenheim,
and Georday, decided by the BTA in 1940 and upheld, on
the essential point, by the Fourth Circuit. 55 In Ardbern, the
foreign corporation did not timely file its 1929 through
1932 returns. The IRS contacted the corporation about the
missing returns, after which, in June 1937, the corporation tried to file the returns with an IRS agent. Then,
however, the law required those returns to be filed with
the collectOr of internal revenue in Baltimore, -so the agent
refused to accept the returns. In July 1937 the IRS issued
a notice of deficiency and prepared SFRs. The corporation's petition to the BTA was filed in September 1937,
and the IRS's answer was filed in December 1937. After
further attempts, the corporation properly filed the returns in October 1938.
The BTA held for the IRS on the strength of Taylor
Securities. In a confused opinion, the Fourth Circuit
modified and remanded but for reasons unique to the
case. The Fourth Circuit faulted the IRS agent for not
directing the taxpayer, when it proffered the returns in
June 1937, to file the returns with the collector in Baltimore_sn The court continued:
It is conceded that, if the returns ... had been properly filed before the Collector at Baltimore, taxpayer

54
Id. at 703-704. The last sentence may be an exaggeration.
Assuming the existence of an underpayment, the taxpayer
could have "something to lose": a delinquency penalty imposed
under what is currently section 6651. Also, failure to file may
affect the corporation's ability to make some tax elections.
55 Ardbern Co., Ltd. v. Commissioner, 41 B.T.A. 910 (1940),
modified and remanded on other grounds, 120 F.2d 424 (4th Cir.
1941); Blenheim Co., Ltd. v. Commissioner, 42 B.T.A. 1248 (1940),
affd, 125 F.2d 906 (4th Cir. 1942); Georday Enter., Ltd. v. Commissioner, 1940 WL 10265 (B.T.A. memo. 1940), affd, 126 F.2d 384
(4th Cir. 1942).
56
The circuit court acknowledged that "there is no statutory
authority for the making or filing" of those returns with an IRS
agent, or indeed with anyone "other than the Collector designated in the statute, to accept returns." Nonetheless, the court
continued, "fair dealing between the Government and a taxpayer would require the agent to whom the returns were

would have been entitled to the deductions
claimed ... [The taxpayer should prevail when] he
shows that prior to ... assessment [of the deficiency]
he attempted in good faith to file a return in which
such deductions were claimed. Titls is nothing but
· elementary justice, and we find nothing in the statute
which forbids it."
The words "prior to ... assessment" seemed to signal
the Fourth Circuit's agreement that the statute contains a
timing element, although perhaps a different time (making of the assessment) than the BTA may have suggested
in Taylor Securities (issuance of the notice of deficiency). 58
However, the Fourth Circuit followed the above quotation with a quotation from Anglo-American that suggested
there is no time element in the statute at all. 59 The court
did not attempt to reconcile those inconsistent strands.
The Fourth Circuit also buttressed its conclusion by
invoking the canon that doubt regarding the meaning of
tax statutes is resolved against the gove~ent and in

improperly tendered for filing to advise the taxpayer as to the
official and place where the returns should be filed." 120 F.2d at
426.
57
Id. I have reservations about the court's reasoning. Fairness
alone is not, generally a judicially enforceable aspect of tax law,
e.g., Commissioner v. Kowalski, 434 U.S. 77, 95-96 (1977), and the
circuit court did not attempt to fit its conception of "elementary
justice" into a recognized doctrine such as equitable estoppel.
However, it is not necessary in this article to explore those
reservations. See generally Richard J. Wood, "Supreme Court
Jurisprudence of Tax Fairness," 36 Seton Hall L. Rev. 421 (2006).
It is possible, but not certain, that the "good cause" exception
in the 1990 regulation would lead the IRS to waive the 18-month
limitation were a case like Ardbern to occur now. See 126 T.C. at

•

154 (Swift, )., dissenting).
58
However, it is not entirely clear that the Fourth Circuit
understood "assessment" to differ from "issuance of a notice of
deficiency." Assessment has a term of art meaning under section
6203. Generalist judges, however, sometimes use the term
colloquially, as essentially equivalent to "determination." See,
e.g., Demirjian v. Commissioner, 457 F.2d 1, 2 n.3 (3d Cir. 1972). It
is unclear from Ardbern whether the circuit court was using
assessment in its technical sense or its colloquial sense.
Moreover, even if the Ardbern court meant assessment in its
technical sense, that position would be inconsistent with most of
the cases. In general, assessment can't be made until after the
IRS issues the deficiency notice and after the decision in any
ensuing Tax Court (or, earlier, B.T.A.) case becomes final. Section
6213(a). As will be seen from the description of the other
pre-Swallows cases infra, those cases do not defer the terminal
date until so late in the process. See, e.g., Espinosa, 107 T.C. at 157
(rejecting, at least on the facts of that case, the taxpayer's
argument that the terminal date is not earlier than the date of
issuance of the deficiency notice).
59
120 F.2d at 426 (quoting 38 B.T.A. at 716: "Inasmuch as
separate sections deal with 'manner' and 'time,' we think it
highly improbable that Congress ever intended to include the
element of time in the section dealing primarily with the
manner of filing.").

(Footnote continued in next co)umn.)

356

•

TAX NOTES, July 24, 2006

,,
'

COMMENTARY I SPECIAL REPORT

•

•

favor of the taxpayer. 60 That canon appeared in many
cases in the first half of the 20th century but is now
generally discredited.6 1
Any confusion created by Ardbern about the Fourth
Circuit's view was cleared up by its decision in Blenheim,
which strongly endorsed Taylor Securities and made no
mention of Anglo-American. In Blenheim, the foreign corporation filed a personal holding company return (Form
1120H), but not a regular corporate income tax return
(Form 1120), for tax year 1934. The IRS asked the corporation to file a Form 1120, but the corporation declined to
do so. The IRS prepared an SFR in April 1938 and issued
a deficiency notice in May 1938. The corporation filed the
Form 1120 in August 1938.
The BTA held that the 1120H could not take the place
of the Form 1120 since the personal holding company tax
is separate and distinct from the corporate income tax. 62
The board held for the IRS, citing Taylor Securities for the
proposition that a taxpayer cannot "take advantage from
an alleged return submitted by the taxpayer not only
after the [IRS prepares an SFR] but also after the issuance
of a notice of deficiency." 63
The board added that Anglo-American "does not aid
petitioner, since it held only that a return filed before the
determination of a deficiency was sufficient compliance."64 That reading moves Anglo-American from "timing isn't part of the statute at all" to "timing is part of the
statute and determination of the deficiency is the critical
time demarcation." As noted above, the BTA's AngloAmerican holding is in conflict with its "manner doesn't
include timing" discussion. The BTA in Blenheim resolved
the conflict by preferring the holding over the "manner"
discussion.
The equitable factor present in Ardbern was not also
present in Blenheim, and the Fourth Circuit affirmed.
First, it held that the statute does contemplate a timing
element. "It is true that [the statuteJ contains no reference
to a time element. Nevertheless, we feel that the [Form
1120 filed in August 1938] was not a sufficient or timely
compliance with [the statute] to entitle the petitioner to
the deductions claimed therein."6s
Second, the Fourth Circuit explained why a timing
rule is implicit in the statute. The court noted the IRS's
extended but unsuccessful efforts to induce the corporation to file voluntarily. The corporation's "inactivity and
uncooperative attitude" forced the IRS -to prepare an
SFR. 66
The difficulty here encountered by the Commissioner in attempting to ascertain the petitioner's
correct income tax is a striking example of the many

60
120 F.2d at 426 (quoting United States v. Merriam, 263 U.S.
179 (1923)).

61

•

See generally Steve R. Jolmson, "Should Ambiguous Rev, enue Laws Be Interpreted in Favor of Taxpayers?" Nevada
La":?£er, April 2002, at 15.
42 B.T.A. at 1251-1252; see section 541.
63

42 B.T.A. at 1251.

administrative problems inherent in the application
of the federal income tax to foreign corporations.
This has prompted Congress to impose special
conditions on such corporations. . . . This situation
is pregnant with possibilities of tax evasion. In
express recognition of this fertile danger to the
orderly administration of the income tax as applied
to foreign corporations, Congress conditioned its
grant of deductions upon the timely filing of true,
proper and complete returns. 67
The Blenheim court identified the "SFR preparation"
terminal date as originating from Taylor Securities, but the
court did not treat that date as invariable.
Without prescribing an absolute and rigid rule that
whenever the Commissioner files a return [an SFR]
for a foreign corporation the taxpayer is completely
and automatically denied the benefit of deductions
or credits, we yet hold that the facts of the instant
case justify a disallowance of deductions which
petitioner might otherwise have been entitled to
claim, had it filed a timely return in compliance
with the statutory requirement. 68
Georday was a companion case to Blenheim. The return
was filed more than five years after its due date, and also
after the SFR, after the deficiency notice, and after the
BTA petition. The Fourth Circuit denied the claimed
deductions because the corporation failed to file "within
the reasonable terminal period prescribed in the Blenheim
case." 69
A decades-long gap in the litigation ended with two
1996 Tax Court decisions: Espinosa and InverWorld.'O In
those cases, the Tax Court joined the BTA and the Fourth
Circuit in concluding that section 882 includes a time
element.
Espinosa involved section 874(a), whicH deals with
nonresident alien individuals and is in pari materia with
section 882(c)(2). The nonresident had not filed income
tax returns for 1987 through 1991 when the IRS contacted
him in November 1992. In February 1993 the IRS notified
him that it had prepared SFRs. In March 1993 the IRS sent
him a "doomsday" letter stating that he could no longer
claim deductions for the years. In October 1993 the
nonresident filed his returns for the years 1987 through
1991. In January 1994 the IRS issued a deficiency notice.
The court noted that section 874, like section 882,
contains no time limit "on its face," 71 and it described the
two sections as "draconian provisions designed to induce
foreign corporations and nonresident alien individuals to
file tax returns." 72 Based on its rehearsing the cases
described above, the Tax Court made three observations:

67Id.; see also id. at 910. In addition to policy, the Blenheim
court justified its result by perceived congressional intent and
by reference to regulations under the statute regarding nonresident alien individuals, which essentially parallels the statute
regarding foreign corporations. Id. at 909-910.
68
69

6 .:.Id.

70

65

125 F.2d at 908.

71

66

Id. at 909.
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Espinosa, supra note 27; InverWorld, supra note 2.9.

107 T.C. at 150.
"Id. at 152 (citing

Blenheim, 125 F.2d at 909) .
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(1) "Although section 874(a) contains no express time
limit, at some point there exists a terminal date, after
which a taxpayer can no longer claim the benefit of
deductions by filing a return." 73 (2) The terminal date is
not the return due date established under section 6072."
(3) Absent "compelling equitable considerations," as in
Ardbern, "a taxpayer cannot claim the benefit of deductions by filing a return after the Commissioner has
prepared a substitute return and issued a notice of
deficiency.'' 75
The rationale for the timing element is "the policy
behind the provisions. . . . If no cut-off point existed,
taxpayers would have an indefinite time to file a return,
and these provisions would be rendered meaningless. . . . The prior case law established the terminal
date ... to ensure that [the sections] would have the in
tcrrore1n effect that Congress intended."76
The facts of Espinosa differed from those of some of the
prior cases. In Espinosa, the returns were filed after the
IRS prepared the SFRs but before it issued the notice of
deficiency. The taxpayer argued, first, that the statute
includes no time element at all and, second, in the
alternative, that the terminal date should be the date the
notice of deficiency is issued. The Tax Court rejected both
of the taxpayer's arguments "where, as here, the Commissioner has notified the taxpayer that he has not filed
a return and has given the taxpayer a reasonable time
within wf>ich to file a return.""
Finally, in InverWorld the foreign corporation had not
filed its returns for the years at issue - not even by the
date of trial of the case. On the strength of Georday and
Blenlieim, the Tax Court denied deductions sought by the
corp oration. 78

C. Summary
The preceding discussion shows that, if AngloA1nerican ever stood for a "no timing element" rule, that
rule was abandoned by the subsequent cases. At the end
of the day, all three tribunals that had considered the
question - the BTA,79 the Fourth Circuit, 80 and the Tax
Court81 - agreed that some timing requirement, some
terminal date, is implicit in section 882.
Significantly, even the Swallows majority conceded
that the prior cases establish that section 882(c)(2) implies
a timing requirement - although the majority appears
not to have recognized that it was making that concession. At first, the majority rejected the existence of this
requirement, stating: "The disputed regulations were
issued after both the Court of Appeals for the Fourth

73

107 T.C. at 156 (citing Taylor Securities and Blenhein1).

74

Id. (citing Anglo-American).

75

Id. (citing Blenheim and Taylor Securities).
Id. at 157.

76

77Id.
78

71 T.C.M. at 3237-3256.
1n Taylor Securities, Ardbem, Blenheim, and Georday.

79

80In Ardbern (absent unusual circumstances not present in
Siual/ows), Blenheim, and Georday.
81
In Espinosa and lnverWorld.
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Circuit and the Board had repeatedly and consistently
held that the relevant text did not include a timely filing
requirement. ''8 2
If, by "a timely filing requirement," the majority
meant a terminal date the same as the section 6072 filing
date, 83 the statement is correct but beside the point since
the 1990 regulation does not use the section 6072 filing
date as the terminal date. If instead the majority meant
that the prior cases rejected any terminal date or event,
the majority immediately contradicted itself. The majority attached a footnote to the sentence quoted above. The
footnote reads:

•

The relevant meaning that we distill from the
referenced cases of the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit and the Board is twofold. First, a
foreign corporation must file a tax return in order to
deduct its expenses. Second, the Commissioner's
preparation of a substitute return for the corporation is generally considered to be the corporation's
return for Federal income tax purposes and divests
the taxpayer of its entitlement to file a .return for
itself. 84
The majority's footnote contradicts its "no timing
rule" view: The SFR "rule"85 is a timing rule. The
majority is saying that the corporation can file its own
return (and claim any deductions) until the date the IRS
prepares an SFR. After that date, the corroration can no
longer file its own return (and so loses its deductions). A
timing requirement remains a timing requirement regardless of whether its terminal date is expressed by (1)
year, mo111th, or day; or (2) the date of the occurrence of
some measuring event.s6

III. Treasury, Not the Courts, Should Draw the Line
Based on the prior case law, the question no longer is
"Is there a terminal date or event?" The cases say that
there is. The questions now are "What s·hould that date
be?" and "Who -Treasury or the courts - should select
that date?" It is to those questions that we now turn.
The relevant questions entail line-drawing. Below, I
argue first that there was room for Treasury to draw the
timing line in 1990 since the line had not previously been

82
126 T.C. at 137; see also id. at 98 (referring to "the consistent
interpretation of the relevant text by the Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit and the Board not to include any timely filing
requirement") and 123-124 ("The Court in Espinosa did not limit
Anglo-Am. Direct Tea Trading Co., Ltd. to that observation or to
any other point.").
83Judge Halpern correctly noted in dissent that the majority's
use of the term "timely" is confusing. Id. at 158.
84
Id. at 137 n.22; see also id. at 142-143.
85
It would be too strong to say the prior cases fixed the
timing requirement at the date the SFR is prepared. The cases
suggest other possibilities as well without definitely selecting
among the various possibilities. See Part III.A.
86For example, the duration of an automobile warranty could
be phrased as "for 50,000 miles or one year from the date of
purchase, whichever comes first." That language imposes a time
limit on the warranty, whether measured by event or date.
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drawn definitively and second that drawing lines concerning the timing of return filing is appropriately an
administrative, not a judicial, matter anyway.
A. Absence of Definitive Prior Rule
If Congress had provided clear instructions on where
to draw the line regarding time of return filing, the sole
task would be to implement those instructions. But
Congress did not provide those instructions, either in the
statutory text or in legislative history. In that respect, our
situation is similar to that in the Fulman case in which the
Supreme Court remarked, in the process of upholding a
tax regulation: "While obviously some rule ... must be
applied, Congress ... failed expressly to provide one." 87
That leaves drawing the line to Treasury since, as
shown in Part 111.B, Treasury is the "gap filler" in our tax
system. However, it was not until 1990 - more than 60
years after the first iteration of what is now section 882 that Treasury responded via regulations to the statutory
gap regarding time cutoff.
In the intervening decades, had the courts filled the
gap by developing a timing rule? Based on the case law
review in Part II, the answer is no. The courts resolved
the specific controversies before them, but, in doing so,
developed nothing that could be called a defined and
settled rule. ss
As shown in Part !LB, possible terminal dates appearing in the cases ranged from the date SFRs were prepared, to the date of the "doomsday" letter, to the date of
the deficiency notice, to the dates of the trial court
pleadings, to the assessment date. Moreover, that already
moving target might, the cases suggested, be moved a bit
more by circumstances such as whether the taxpayer
tried in good faith to file returns earlier; whether, how
often, and with what intensity the IRS contacted the
taxpayer about the missing return(s); and whether a
"reasonable'" time had passed after the IRS contacted the
taxpayer. The prior cases are studded with flexibilitydriven modifiers like "under the circumstances here
present"s9 and "without prescribing an absolute and
rigid rule. " 90
Had there been a settled judicial rule, a Brand X issue
would have arisen. 91 I think the 1990 regulation would be
upheld under Brand X analysis, but that is a topic for the
second article. For present purposes, it is enough to note
that there is no competition here between the regulation

and an established judicial rule. The prior cases were too
variable, flexible, and uncertain to stand for a settled rule.
B. Administrative, Not Judicial, Prerogative
When there is a statutory gap to be filled (in this case,
a line in time to be drawn), the relevant administrative
agency, not a court, is the appropriate body to perform
the task. Congress has made that clear in the area of tax
via section 7805(a),92 and the Supreme Court has made it
clear in administrative law generally. The Court said in
Chevron: "The power of an administrative agency to
administer a congressionally created ... program necessarily requires the formulation of policy and the making
of rules to fill any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by
Congress."'n Even as to an implicit delegation, "a court
may not substitute its own construction ... for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an
agency. '"i4
But one need not depend on Chevron to reach that
result in the Suia/louis context. The Swallows majority
erected National Miif.flr!r as the controlling standard. Both
the line of cases of which National Muffler is a part and
National Muffler itself made it clear that gap-filling and
line-drawing are up to Treasury and the IRS. In the
oft-cited Correll case, a forerunner of Natinal Muffler, the
Supreme Court said:

Alternatives to the Commissioner's sleep or rest
rule are of course available. Improvements might
be imagined. But we do not sit as a committee of
revision to perfect the administration of the tax
laws. Congress has delegated to the Commissioner,
not to the courts, the task of prescribing all needful
rules and regulations for the enforcement of the
Internal Revenue Code. In this area of limitless
factual variations, it is the province of Congress and
the Commissioner, not the courts, to 1make the
appropriate adjustments. 95
Numerous other cases of the same line are to the same
effect. 96 So is National Muffler itself. After quoting the
above language from Correll, National Muffler offered
reasons for administrative primacy in promulgating subsidiary rules. It "helps ensure that in this area of limitless
factual variations, like cases will be treated alike. It also
helps guarantee that the rules will be written by masters
of the subject, who will be responsible for putting the
rules into effect. " 97

87

Fnlman v. United States, 434 U.S. 528, 533 (1978).
The cases did not "provide guidance of general applicability concerning timeliness: [they} merely resolve[d] issues creThose
ated by unique fact patterns on a case-by-case basis.
cases do not unambiguously establish the limits of timeliness .... Timeliness is required, but timeliness is not defined."
126 T.C. at 160 (Halpern, )., dissenting).
89
Anglo-Am., 38 B.T.A. at 715.
90
Blenheim, 125 F.2d at 910.
91
See National Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet
Servs., 125 S. Ct. 2688, 2700 (2005) (holding that "[a] court's prior
judicial construction of a statute trumps an agency construction
otherwise entitled to Chevron deference only if the prior court
decision holds that its construction follows from the unambiguous terms of the statute and thus leaves no room for agency·
discretion").
88
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Treasury "shall prescribe all needful rules and regulations
for the enforcement of fthe Code}." Section 7805(a); see, e.g.,
Helvering v. R.J. Rei;nolds Tobacco Co., 306 U.S. 110, 114 (1939).
93
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 (quoting Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S.

199, 231 (1974)).
94
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844.
95
United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299, 306-307 (1967) (citations, quotation marks, and footnotes omitted).
96
See, e.g., United States v. Cleveland Indians Baseball Co., 532
U.S. 200, 218-219, Doc 2001-11045, 2001 TNT 75-7 (2001); Commissioner v. Portland Ceml'!/'lt Co., 450 U.S. 156, 169 (1981); United
States v. Cartwright, 411 U.S. 546, 550 (1973); Bingler v. Johnson,
394 U.S. 741, 749-751 (1969); Commissioner v. Stidger, 386 U.S. 287,

296 (1967).
97

440 U.S. at 477 (quotation marks and citations omitted).
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The Swallozvs majority invoked separation of powers
concerns. It felt that, through the 1990 regulation, the
executive branch had infringed on Congress's authority
to make the laws and on the courts' authority to interpret
them. 98 In my view, separation ,of powers concerns are
implicated in Swallows, but they cut the other way. The
real institutional-legitimacy problem in Swallows is that
the Tax Court insufficiently honored the role of the
agency in drawing lines under and filling gaps in the
statute. As Judge Holmes said in dissent, the approach of
the Swallows majority:
simply doesn't reflect the contemporary understanding of administrative law that regulations are
a way to make policy choices, not just a way to
interpret ambiguous statutory phrases ... [There
are] different competencies of judges and regulation writers. Regulation writers are doing their jobs
when they make up safe harbors and lay down
deadlines; for judges to do so - instead of setting
up fact-bound tests of "reasonableness" - looks
like an exercise of legislative or administrative,
rather than judicial, power.99

C. Summary
The prior cases established that a time limitation is
implicit in section 882(c)(2). Congress did not instruct
where to draw the line regarding timing and the courts
established no settled rule regarding timing. Linedrawing and gap-filling are, anyway, properly the province of Treasury and the IRS. The agencies had the
authority to promulgate a timing rule in the 1990 regulation.

IV. The Regulation's Timing Rule Is Reasonable
Treasury has the authority to fill in gaps in the code,
but of course that authority is not unbridled. 100 Thus, we
need to consider the contents of the 1990 regulation to
ascertain whether Treasury exercised its line-drawing
authority reasonably. For two reasons, I believe that it
did. The regulation (1) effectively furthers the statutory
purpose and (2) does not impose unreasonable burdens
on taxpayers.
A. Statutory Purpose
It is common in statutory interpretation to favor the
approach that best advances the purposes of the statute.101 As shown below, the purpose of section 882(c)(2) is
to motivate foreign corporations to file returns, and the

bright line in the regulation furthers that purpose better
than would the indefinite timing possibilities suggested
in cases.
The relevant statutory purpose is to encourage the
filing of returns. "The many administrative problems
inherent in the application of the federal income tax to
foreign corporations ... prompted Congress to impose
special conditions on such corporations." 102 Given the
difficulties in gathering information about foreign corporations and their activities, 103 it is particularly important
that foreign corporations file tax returns. Thus, "Congress conditioned its grant of deductions upon the timely
filing of true, proper and complete retums." 104 "In view
of such a specific prerequisite [in the statute} it is inconceivable that Congress contemplated ... that taxpayers
could wait indefinitely to file returns and [still be allowed
to claim deductions]."tos
The 1990 regulation advances that purpose via the
certainty resulting from a bright line. Under the regulation, foreign corporations know that they will forfeit their
ability to claim deductions if their returns ar~ more than
18 months late. The rule is clear, definite, and understandable, 106 which should induce the desired behavior.
In contrast, as described in Part III.A, the prior cases
"prescrib[ed] [no] absolute and rigid rule." 107 That meant
that taxpayers could adopt a "wait and see" approach,
hoping that their returns could be omitted entirely or, at
least, be filed much later, without putting deductions at
hazard. So (1) perhaps the IRS would never get around to
preparing an SFR at all. (2) Even if the IRS did, it typically
contacts the taxpayer before preparing an SFRW8 The
foreign corporation could wait until this contact, then file
the returns, preserving its deductions. (3) Even if the
returns were filed after the SFR was prepared, the
taxpayer might have reason to hope that the reviewing
court would select one of the other later terminal events
mentioned in the case law, such as issuance of the notice
of deficiency or making of the assessment.
Section 882(c)(2) was intended to motivate return
filing via its in terrorem effect. 109 The bright-line approach
of the regulation furthers that purpose. In contrast, the
indefinite nature of the prior cases encourages a "little to
lose by waiting" attitude on the part of foreign corporations. This would lead to what judges of prior cases

102

Blenheim, supra note 29, 125 F.2d at 909.
3The techniques available to the IRS to gather information
abroad are described in David M. Richardson, Jerome Borison,
and Steve Jolmson, Civil Tax Procedure 101-102 (2005).
104
Blenheim, supra note 29, 125 F.2d at 909; see also 126 T.C. at
10

98

182 (Holmes,)., dissenting) (section 882(c)(2) was "unambigu-

99

ously aimed at giving foreign corporations a major incentive to
file their returns").
105
Taylor Securities, supra note 29, at 703-704.
106
"The 18-month grace period might be shorter or longer
than the old judicially constructed one. It is rmdeniably more

See 126 T.C. at 147-148.
Id. at 174.
10
°The Swallows majority properly stated: "The authority
delegated to the Secretary, however, is not limitless and, if
exercised improperly, may usurp the role of Congress as the
legislator in our system of Government." Id. at 129.
101 See, e.g., Zedner v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 1976, 1985 (2006);
United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 202-204 (1979); Church
of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 463-465 (1892); see
William N. Eskridge Jr., Philip P. Frickey, and Elizabeth Garrett,
Legislation and Statuton; Interpretation 228-230 (2d ed. 2006).
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definite." 126 T.C. at 162 (Holmes, )., dissenting).
107
Blenheim, supra note 29, 125 F.2d at 910.
08
' See !RM 5.1.10.3.2 and 5.1.11.6.5. Regarding SFRs generally, see reg. section 301.6020-lT.
109
Espinosa, supra note 27, at 157.
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feared: "[putting] a premium on evasion." 110 Thus, the
content of the regulation is reasonable because its clear
rule better advances the congressional purpose .
The use of bright lines to further return filing and
accommodate administrative realities is well known in
our tax system. In a case involving the delinquency
penalty, the Supreme Court chose a bright-line approach,
saying:
Deadlines are inherently arbitrary; fixed dates,
however, are often essential to accomplish necessary results. The Government has millions of taxpayers to monitor, and our system of selfassessment in the initial calculation of a tax simply
cannot work on any basis other than one of strict
filing standards. Any less rigid standard would risk
encouraging a lax attitude toward filing dates.
Prompt payment of taxes is imperative to the
Government, which should not have to assume the
burden of unnecessary ad hoc determinations. 111
B. No Unreasonable Burden
The viability of the 1990 regulation will turn mainly on
its consistency with the statute, not on its effect on
taxpayers. Nonetheless, in an inquiry as open-ended as
reasonableness, little is out of bounds. Moreover, as
Ardbern reminds us, 112 as long as human beings decide
cases, perceived equities will always be relevant atmospherically, whether or not they're relevant doctrinally.
In that context, it is worth noting that the 1990
regulation neither traduces taxpayer reliance interests
nor imposes hardships on taxpayers. 113 This is so for
three reasons. First, taxpayers had notice 6f the regulation and time to adjust to it. The regulation was initially
released in proposed form in July 1989. 114 After notice
and comment, the final regulation was made effective for
tax years ending after July 31, 1990. 115 Because income tax
return filing is on an annual basis, all foreign corporations doing business in the United States had the opportunity to accommodate their filing practices to the rules
set forth in the regulation. Certainly that was true of the
Swallows taxpayer, since the promulgation of the regulation preceded by several years the first tax year at issue in
the case.u 6
Second, the terminal date under the regulation generally is 18 months after the due date of the foreign
corporation's return for the tax year. Third, the regulation

llOTaylor Securities, supra note 29, 40 B.T.A. at 703-704; see also
Espinosa, supra note 27, at 157-158.
rnunited States v. Boyle, 469 U.S. 241, 249 (1985).
112
See Ardbern, supra note 29, 120 F.2d at 426, discussed at text
accompanying notes 56-57 supra.
113
Cf Anderson, Clayton Co. v. United States, 562 F.2d 972, 981
(5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 944 (1978); I.esavoy Foundation v. Commissioner, 238 F.2d 589, 591-594 (3d Cir. 1956) (reliance
and burden are among relevant factors in deciding whether a
retroactive IRS revocation of a taxpayer-specific ruling is an
abuse of discretion).
rn54 Fed. Reg. 31547 Uuly 31, 1989).
115
T.D. 8322, 1990-2 C.B. 172; 55 Fed. Reg. 50827 (Dec. 11,
1990).
116
126 T.C. at 138; see text accompanying note 157 infra.
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has an answer to the unusual instances in which that
18-month period may not be enough. The 1990 version of
the regulation provided that the time limitation "may be
waived by the [IRS] in rare and unusual circumstances if
good cause for such waiver ... is established by the
foreign corporation." 117 The waiver provision was revised, in 2002 and 2003 amendments, to apply if the
corporation "establishes to the satisfaction of the [IRS]
that the corporation ... acted reasonably and in good
faith in failing to file a U.S. income tax return." 118
C. Summary

In Atlantic Mutual, the Supreme Court upheld another
interpretive tax regulation that the Tax Court had
thought invalid. The Court rejected the taxpayer's "plain
meaning of the statute" argument, 11 9 and it approved the
regulation because "the interpretation adopted by
the ... Regulation seems to us a reasonable accommodation - and one that the statute very likely intended - of
the competing interests of fairness, administrability, and
avoidance of abuse." 12°
A similar characterization, I believe, applies to the
regulation at issue in Swallozvs. The regulation's brightline terminal date promotes Congress's purpose in enacting section 882(c)(2) and responds to a genuine need in
sound administration of the income tax regarding foreign
corporations. Also, taxpayers are not unduly burdened
by the regulation since they had notice of it, it was
prospective in application, it grants a 11h-year grace
period, and it provides for waiver of the terminal date in
proper cases. The 1990 regulation is reasonable in substance.

V. Restoring National Muffler Deference
Invalidating a regulation is serious business because.
rather than affecting merely one taxpayer for one year, it
affects a whole class of taxpayers for potentially many
years. But the stakes in Swallows are even higher. The
Swallows majority distorted the National Muffler standard.
If its approach metastasizes to other cases, the original
deferential nature of that standard could be compromised.

National Muffler is part of a line of cases that is specific
to tax regulations and rulings, a line that originated
before, has continued after, and exists in unclear relationship to Chevron. 121 Below, we first examine the deferential
character of the line of cases generally. Then, we consider
National Muffler specifically, including its animating
spirit, general test, and specific considerations.

n?Former reg. section l.882-4(a)(3)(ii).
Reg. section l.882-4(a)(3)(ii).
119
Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co. v. Commissioner, 523 U.S. 382, 387-389,
Doc 98-12876, 98 TNT 77-8 (1998).
120
/d. at 390-391.
121
See generally Paul L. Caron, "Tax Myopia Meets Tax
Hyperopia: The Unproven Case of Increased Judicial Deference
to Revenue Rulings," 57 Ohio St. L.J. 637, 654-669 (1996); ABA
Deference Report, supra note 50, at 759-777.
118
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A. Line of Cases Generally
The spirit in which a court applies a standard can be as
important as, or more important than, the linguistic
formulation of that standard. 122 The Supreme Court has
repeatedly taught that the tax-specific line of authority of
which National Muffler is a part is deferential.
In one frequently cited case, the Court said: "This
Court has many times declared that Treasury regulations
must be sustained unless unreasonable and plainly inconsistent with the revenue statutes." 123 Tax regulations will
be upheld as long as they "implement the congressional
mandate in some reasonable manner." 124 Moreover, even
if the regulation is interpretive, not legislative, "we must
still treat the regulation with deference." 12s
The Court's actual behavior in these cases corresponds
to its rhetoric of deference. In numerous cases of this line,
the Supreme Court reversed circuit court decisions invalidating regulations or subregulation IRS positions. 126
In far fewer cases did the Supreme Court strike down
a regulation, and those cases typically involved considerations not present in Swallows. For example, in Vogel
Fertilizer and Rowan there were congressional committee
reports adverse to the regulation; 127 no such reports are

adverse to the Swallows regulation. 128 The problem with
the regulation at issue in R.J. Reynolds was its retroactiv-

ity; 12':! the Su)allows regulation was prospective. 13 0 In
Cartwright, the tax regulation for valuing securities was
"manifestly inconsistent with the most elementary pro-

visions of the Investment Company Act of 1940 and
operate[d] without regard to the market in mutual fund
s}:lares that the Act created and regulates." 1 31 The Swallows regulation does not clash with any nontax rule of

•

law.
The situation in the lower federal courts defies neat
categorization. 132 It is worth noting that the Tax Court's
decisions have often been reversed when they have
found "regulations unreasonable after the extensive re-

view of the sort [it engaged in in Swallows]."133 Swallows
should be added to this regrettable roll.
Thus, the Supreme Court has made clear by word and
deed that the line of authority of which National Muffler is
a part is congenial, not hostile, to upholding Treasury
regulations. 1 ~4 That spirit should be borne in mind by
courts applying National Muffler.

B. National Muffler
The Swallows majority maintained that the 1990 regulation failed under National Muffler because the timing
limitation "is inconsistent with the plain meaning of [the]
statute. " 135 It then analyzed six specific considerations

that had been mentioned in National Muffler:
(1) Whether the regulation is a substantially contemporaneous construction of the sta~ute by those
presumed to have been aware of congressional

122

For example, the Skidmore standard can result in deference
ranging from 'great' to 'some' to 'little' depending on its
application. ABA Deference Report, supra note 50, at 751; see
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139-140 (1944). Similarly,
Cl1evron can be either indulgent or restrictive depending on how
its steps are applied. See, e.g., John F. Coverdale, "Court Review
of Tax Regulations and Revenue Rulings in the Chevron Era," 64
Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 35, 39-40 (1995); Elizabeth Garrett, Step One of
Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council (3d rev. draft), at 2-3,
prepared for the_Scope of Judicial Revision portion of the Project
on the Administrative Procedure Act (June 2001), available at
http:/ /www.abanet.org/ adminlaw I apa/ chevron_revised_3.doc
(last visited on June 22, 2006); Irving Salem and Richard Bress,
"Agency Deference Under the Judicial Microscope of the Supreme Court," Tax Notes, Sept. 4, 2000, p. 1257.
1221
Comn1issioner v. South Texas Lumber Co., 333 U.S. 496, 501

(1948) (emphasis added).
124

Commissioner v. Portland Cement Co., 450 U.S. 156, 169

(1981); United States v. Cartwright, 411 U.S. 546, 550 (1973); United
States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299, 307 (1967) (emphasis added).
125
Boeing Co. v. United States, 537 U.S. 437, 448, Doc 2003-5648,
2003 TNT 43-7 (2003).
126

See, e.g., United States v. Cleveland Indians Baseball Co., 532
U.S. 200 (2001); Commissioner v. Portland Cement Co., 450 U.S. 156
(1981); Fulman v. United States, 434 U.S. 528 (1978) (resolving
circuit split); Bingler v. Johnson, 394 U.S. 741 (1969); United States
v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299 (1967); Commissioner v. South Texas Lumber
Co., 333 U.S. 496 (1948); Helvering v. Winmill, 305 U.S. 79 (1938);
United States v. Dakota-Montana Oil Co., 288 U.S. 459 (1933)
(resolving circuit split); cf. United States v. Boyle, 469 U.S. 241
(1985) (same in a tax case citing Chevron).
127
United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., 455 U.S. 16, 26-31 (1982);
Rowan Cos., Inc. v. United States, 452 U.S. 247, 255-258 (1981).
128
The Swallows majority's best (but insufficient) attempt to
identify a committee report favorable to its position was a "cf."
to a 1996 report under section 874 to the effect that losing their

intent; (2) the manner in which a regulation dating
from a later period evolved; (3) the length of time
that the,regulation has been in effect; (4) the reliance
placed upon the regulation; (5) the consistency of
the Secretary's interpretation; and (6) the degree of
scrutiny Congress has devoted to the regulation
during subsequent reenactments of the statute. 136

Contemporaneity: The majority noted that the regulation was promulgated 62 years after the original version

of section 882(c)(2) was enacted (and 72 years after the

deductions "may result in quite heavy tax burdens" for nonresident alien individuals. 126 T.C. at 136 n.21 (quoting S. Rep.
1707, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 26-77 (1966), reprinted at 1966-2 C.B.

1059, 1076-1077).
129

Helvering v. R.]. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 306 U.S. 110, 116-117

(1939).
130

T.D. 8322, 1990-2 C.B. 172, 172.

131

Uniled States v. Cartwright, 411 U.S. 546, 557 (1973).
See generally ABA Deference Report, supra note 50, at

132

763-776.
133
Swallows, 126 T.C. at 162 n.2 (Ho!rnes, )., dissenting) (citing
numerous cases in which the Tax Court was reversed on app~al
after invalidating a regulation).
134
Indeed, it may be that Chevron - which usually is
considered deferential, e.g., Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct.

2208, 2235-2236 (2006) (Roberts, C.j., concurring) (describing
Chevron as a "generous" standard) - is less deferential regarding tax regulations than is the tax-specific line of cases. See Ellen
P. Aprill, "Muffled Chevron: Judicial Review of Tax Regulations," 3 Fla. Tax. Rev. 51, 52 (1996).
135
126 T.C. at 132; see also id. at 132-136.
136
Jd. at 136-137 (citing 440 U.S. at 477).

(Footnote continued in next column.)
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original version of substantially similar section 874(a))
and so was not a substantially contemporaneous construction.137
Manner of evolution: The majority offered four points
adverse to the regulation on this score. (1) The regulation
was issued after the Fourth Circuit and the BIA "had
repeatedly and consistently held that the relevant text did
not include a timely filing requirement. " 138 (2) The regulation was issued after multiple reenactments of the
statute, "none of which altered the judiciary's construction of the text." 139 (3) The regulations "merely adopted
[the IRS's] unsuccessful litigating position." 140 (4) Commentators had objected to a time limitation in the regulation.141
Tenure: The majority noted that the 1990 regulation

•

"had only been in effect for approximately three years as
of the first year in issue."142
Reliance: "Petitioner obviously did not rely upon the
disputed regulations when it filed the subject returns
untimely. In fact, the record before us persuades us that
petitioner filed those returns relying on the belief that it
would be [able to claim its deductions]."143
Consistency: The 1957 regulations had not contained a
timing limitation. 144
Congressional scrutiny: "Section 882(c)(2) has not been
amended since the issuance of the disputed regulation."t4s
In my view, the Swallows majority's treatment of
National Muffler is deficient. It is wrong regarding many
particulars, especially those that are most important.
More seriously, it misperceives the role of the particulars
in the overall analysis and it effectively converts National
Muffler from a deferential standard into a hard-look
standard.
1. Particulars. The six considerations mentioned in National Muffler were never intended to be applied in a
wooden, "checklist" manner, as the Supreme Court made
clear in the case itself. From that perspective, reconsider
the Swallows majority's analysis.
Contemporaneity: The Swallows majority was right that
the 1990 regulation is not a contemporaneous construction of the statute, but that means little. The taxpayer in
National Muffler made the same argument, but the Supreme Court upheld the challenged regulation nonetheless. The Court remarked: "Contemporaneity, however, is
only one of many considerations that counsel courts to
defer to the administrative interpretation of a statute. It
need not control here."146
Manner of evolution: All four of the Swallows majority's
points in this regard are wrong or irrelevant. The prior

137
126 T.C at 137.
13sid.

139Id.

I40Id.
141 Id.;
142

see also id. at 127-128.
Id. at 138.

143Id.
144[d.
14sid.
146

440 U.S. at 485.
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cases had, in fact, rejected a "timely filing requirement,''
but the regulation does not require that the return be filed
on time, only that it be filed not later than 18 months after
it would have been timely.
The IRS won most of the prior cases, which makes talk
of an "unsuccessful litigating position" sound strange.
Moreover, the 18-month grace period in the regulation is
considerably more indulgent than - and so does not
merely repeat - the position the IRS started with in
Anglo-American. And, of course, a regulation has more
weight than a mere litigating position, even if their
contents are identical.
I acknowledge that the views of commentators have
some significance. (At least, as a matter of my own
self-interest, I hope that is true.) However, the views of
courts are more significant. As detailed in Part II above,
the prior cases firmly established that some timing element is implicit in the statute. As detailed in Part III and
Part IV, it was Treasury's job to define that time element
and the 1990 regulation did so responsibly. 147
That leaves only the Swallows majority's legislative
reenactment argument. The majority observed that none
of the reenactments altered the prior cases. 148 However,
the majority presented no solid evidence that Congress
was even aware of the prior cases when it was engaged in
the reenacting. 149 The majority appeared to suggest that a
demonstration of aero.al congressional awareness and
approval is unnecessary because it can be "assume[d]"
that Congress knows the law. 150 However, "though
courts have stated this general proposition ... no case has
rested on this presumption alone as a basis for holding
that the statute required [a particular] interpretation." 151
It is reasonable to assume that Congress is aware of major
Supreme Court cases and of other cases that have become
famous or notorious. It severely tests credulity, however,
to assume that Congress is aware of all lower court
decisions in highly technical nooks and crannies of the
law. That being the case, I agree with the dissenters that
the reenactment argument should not have been used at
a11.1s2
However, were that argument admissible, it would
undercut, not support, the majority's National Muffler
analysis. The 1928 statute was reenacted in 1932, 1934,
1936, 1938, 1939, 1954, 1966, and 1986. 153 The 1932, 1934,
1936, and 1938 reenactments shed no light on our issue

147
Treasury explained thusly its rejection of the commentators' objection. The terminal date was retained in the final
regulation "since the statute clearly provides for the denial of
deductions ... if returns are not filed in a timely manner. This
requirement is justified because of different administrative and
compliance concerns with regard to nonresident alien individuals and foreign corporations." T.D. 8322, 1990-2 C.B. 172, 172.
148
126 T.C at 137.
149
See id. at 140-142.
150
Id. at 139 (quoting Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S.
677, 696-697 (1979)).
'
15
'AFL-CIO v. Brock, 835 F.2d 912, 916 n.6 (D.C Cir. 1987)

(em~hasis

in original).
See Part LC supra.
153
See 126 TC at 107-109.
1 2
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since they preceded the Anglo-American decision.1s4 The
1939 reenactment occurred about four months after
Anglo-American. 155 However, the 1939 legislation was the
first codification of the formerly separate session laws
that related to federal taxes. During those four months, it
is doubtful that Congress - engaged in the great labor of
initial codification of all the tax laws - learned of,
carefully pondered, and decided that it agreed with the
Anglo-American decision. Certainly, there is little evidence
that it did.
Whatever minimal support the Swallows majority
could gain from the 1939 reenactment would be more
than overcome by the 1954, 1966, and 1986 reenactments.
In 1939 through 1942, the BTA and the Fourth Circuit
decided Taylor Securities, Ardbern, Blenheim, and Georday,
which, as shown in Part 11.B, established that a time
limitation is implicit in the statute. If, in 1954, 1966, and
1986, Congress was approving anything, it was approving the then-current state of the law, which was defined
by those post-Anglo-American cases.
On those facts, the 1954, 1966, and 1986 reenactments
would be better evidence of Congress's intent than
would the 1939 reenactment. Therefore, if (contrary to my
view) the reenactment doctrine has any role to play in
Swallows at all, that doctrine undermines, rather than
supports, the Swallows holding.
Tenure: The majority stated that the regulation was
promulgated about three years before the first tax year at
issue in Swallows. 156 That computation might be challenged, 157 but there is no need to quibble. Three years is
more than enough to put a taxpayer on notice. Moreover,
of course, many regulations are challenged relatively
early in their lives, and courts have often upheld regulations promulgated only a few years before the first tax
year at issue. 158
Reliance: It would be strange to say that a reason the
regulation should not receive deference is that the taxpayer challenging a regulation did not rely on the regu-

154
Anglo-American was decided on Oct. 4, 1938. The 1938
reenactment was on May 28, 1938. Revenue Act of 1938, ch. 289,

52 Stat. 447, 531.
155The 1939 legislation was approved on Feb. 10, 1939.
Internal Revenue Code of 1939, 53 Stat. 1, 79, 510. Mills (decided
on Oct. 5, 1938) also preceded the 1939 legislation by slightly
more than four months. However, as a BTA memorandum
decision, Mills is even less likely than Anglo-American to have
garnered congressional attention and approval. The other early
BIA memorandum decision, American Investment, was decided

lation. That position would encourage noncompliance
and presumably would put an adverse "thumb on the
scale" in all or most cases in which regulations are
challenged. Surely that's not what the Supreme Court
was trying to do in National Muffler.
Consistency: As a litigating position, the IRS consistently argued that what is now section 882(c)(2) authorizes a timing limitation although its position changed as
to what the terminal date of that limitation is. 159 After it
lost in Anglo-American, the IRS published a nonacquiescence to the case 160 and it continued litigating later cases.
The 1957 regulation did not set out a time limit.
Neither, however, did it affirmatively state that deductions could be claimed, regardless of how late the return
was filed. 161 In any event, a change of regulatory substance is not a doctrinal kiss of death. National Muffler
itself upheld a challenged regulation even though the
regulation constituted an administrative shift. In that
case, the Supreme Court said: "We would be reluctant to
adopt the rigid view that an agency may not alter its
interpretation in light of administrative experience." 162
The Court has said the same in many other cases, both
before 163 and after164 National Muffler. "An initial agency
interpretation is not instantly carved in stone. On the
contrary, the agency, to engage in informed rulemaking,
must consider varying interpretations and the wisdom of
its policy on a continuing basis."165
Congressional scrutiny: Section 882(c)(2) has not been
amended since 1990, so Congress has neither endorsed
nor repudiated the 1990 regulation. This is a nonfactor.
2. Overall analysis. As shown above, I believe that the six
considerations listed in National Muffler support, rather
than undercut, the validity of the regulation at issue in
Swallows. While discussing those considerations, however, we need to resist myopia. Those considerations are
not independent. Instead they are intended to illuminate
the ultimate inquiry, which is whether the regulation
harmonizes with the language, origin, and purpose of the
statute. 166 Based on Parts II, III, and N of this article, I
believe that the 1990 regulation comfortably passes muster under that ultimate inquiry.
The Swallows majority appears to have lost sight of the
spirit behind that inquiry. The portion of National Muffler
that the majority quoted is bracketed by deferential
language that the majority passed over. Before the quoted
language is a strong reaffirmation that Congress delegated the authority to prescribe needed rules to Treasury, not the courts, and that regulations should be upheld

on Apr. 13, 1939, after the 1939 legislation.
15
126 T.C. at 138.
157
The majority's three-year calculation presumably reflects
the span between the finalization of the regulation in December
1990 and the June 1, 1993, start of the taxpayer's 1994 fiscal year.
Beginning the span instead with the July 1989 date the regulation was initially proposed or ending the span with the expiration of the 18-month grace period would produce a spread
considerably longer than three years. Of course, the spreads are
lonrser yet for the other years at issue in Szvallows, 1995 and 1996.
8
See, e.g., Boeing Co. v. United States, 537 U.S. 437 (2003)
(regulation promulgated in 1977; first tax year at issue: 1979);
Fm:vcus Mach. Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 375 (1931) (regulation
promulgated in April 1919; first tax year at issue: 1919).

364

159

See 126 T.C. at 154 (Swift, )., dissenting).
1939-1 C.B. (pt. 1) 39.
161
See former reg. section 1.882-4, 22 Fed. Reg. 8362 (Oct. 23,
1957).
162440 U.S. at 485. The cases described in Part II.B explain
160

why "administrative experience" made clear the need for a
hmin_?," rule. See, e.g., Blenheim Co., supra note 29, 125 F.2d at 910.
16
E.g., Helvering v. Wilshire Oil Co., 308 U.S. 90, 101 (1939).
164
£.g., National Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet
Servs., 125 S. Ct. 2688, 2699-2700 (2005).
165
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 863.
166440 U.S. at 477.
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if they implement the statute "in some reasonable manner."167 Near the end of National Muffler, the Supreme
Court again instructed that: "The choice among reasonable interpretations is for the Commissioner, not the
courts. " 168
The Swallows majority viewed the six considerations
through the wrong lens. One can view those considerations as either subtractive or additive in nature. Under a
subtractive approach, the absence or failure of one or
some considerations would decrease the level of deference accorded, or strip away deference entirely, or even
constitute reason to reject the position taken in the
regulation. In contrast, under an additive approach, the
absence or failure of some considerations would not
lessen deference; instead, their presence or satisfaction
would cause even extra deference, "super deference," to
be accorded to the regulation. The subtractive approach
is "starts high but can go low (or even negative)," while
the additive approach is "starts high and can go even
higher."
The Swallows majority used the six considerations
subtractively. While examples of both subtractive and
additive use can be found in the numerous cases applying National Muffler, I believe that the additive approach
better reflects the Supreme Court's deferential approach
in that case.
The National Muffler Court followed the enumeration
of the considerations with citation to two cases - South
Texas Lumber and Win1nill 169 - and indeed most of the six
considerations are explored or mentioned in one or both
of those cases. Significantly, both of the cited cases
upheld the regulations there at issue. They 'used such of
those considerations as were present as support for the
regulations' validity.
I see Natiqnal Muffler as similar in this spirit to the
Supreme CoU:rt's Dixon decision, 170 which in another tax
context clearly chose the additive over the subtractive
approach. In Dixon, the taxpayer argued that the IRS had
abused its discretion in giving retroactive effect to its
withdrawal of an acquiescence to a prior case. As part of
his argument, the taxpayer looked to an earlier case,
Automobil' Club of Michigan, 171 in which the Court had
upheld another retroactive IRS decision.
The Dixon taxpayer argued that considerations mentioned in Automobile Club of Michigan were not present in
Dixon, so that Dixon should reach a different result. That
was a subtractive argument, and the Dixon Court rejected
it.

Although we mentioned certain facts in support of
our conclusion in Automobile Club that there had not
been an abuse of discretion in that case, it does not
follow that the absence of one or more of these facts

167

Id. at 476-477 (citing many cases).

168/d. at 488.

•

169
/d. at 477 (citing Commissioner v. South Texas Lumber Co., 333
U.S. 496, 501 (1948); Helvering v. Winmill, 305 U.S. 79, 83 (1938)).
170
171

Dixon v. United States, 381 U.S. 68 (1965).
Automobile Club of Michigan v. Co1nmissioner, 353 U.S. 180

(1957).
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in another case wherein a ruling or regulation is
applied retroactively establishes an abuse of discretion.172

Dixon's approach to the abuse of discretion considerations should also be the approach taken regarding the
National Muffler considerations. An additive approach
according extra deference when some conditions are
present better fits the deferential spirit of National Muffler
than does a subtractive approach.
When its guiding spirit is ignored, National Muffler is
distorted. No longer a shield protecting regulations when
fairly possible under the governing statute, National
Muffler becomes a sword to cut down regulations when
judges dislike their content. The majority's approach is
not deference. It is a hard-look approach. 173 Reversing
Swallows would restore National Muffler, and the line of
which it is a part, to their proper role.
VI. Conclusion
The result reached in Stuallows could be reversed on
Chevron or Brand X grounds, as the dissents maintained 174
and as I will argue in the second report. However, the
Third Circuit has yet to apply Chevron to interpretive tax
regulations, 17 " and judges sometimes prefer to resolve
cases on the narrowest or least ambitious ground available.17'' Accordingly, this report has shown that Swallows
can and should be reversed even on the basis of National
Muffler, the standard that the Swallows majority purported to apply.

172381 U.S. at 76.
173
See 126 T.C. at 174 (Holmes, J., dissenting). As to the "hard
look" doctrine generally, see Merrick Garland, '"Deregulation
and judicial Review," 98 Harv. L. Rev. 505, 525-527, 554 (1985).
174
/d. at 149-150 (judge Swift), 157-162 Uudge Halpern), and
171-182 (judge Holmes).
175The key Third Circuit case thus far is E.I. du Pont de
Nen1ours & Co. v. Commissioner, 41 F.3d 130, 135· 136, and n.23,
Doc 94-10819, 94 TNT 240-6 (1994), which considered but did not
decide whether Chevron applies to interpretive tax regulations.
In Clean; v. Waldman, 167 F.3d 801, 807 (1999), a nontax case, the
Third Circuit held that Chevron applies to regulations promulgated through the familiar notice-and-comment process. See 5
U.S.C. section 553(b). Interpretive tax regulations virtually always go through that process. See proc. reg. section 601.601.
176This approach is typified by recent remarks by Chief
Justice John G. Roberts Jr.: ''If it is not necessary to decide more
to dispose of a case, in my view it is necessary not to decide
more." E.J. Dionne Jr., "The Chief Justice Sets a Standard," The
Washington Post, June 20, 2006, at A17 (quoting Chief Justice
Roberts's May 21, 2006, speech to the graduating class of
Georgetown University School of Law); see also David Pannick,
Q.C., "I Used to Be a Judge but I'm All Right Now," The Times
(London), June 6, 2006, at 5 (''a wise judge never decides more
than is necessary to dispose of the case").
A fairly recent example in tax is the Supreme Court's
decision in Ballard v. Commissioner, 544 U.S. 40, 58-59, Doc
2005-4642, 2005 TNT 44-12 (2004). The Court largely avoided
meaty statutory and constitutional issues by holding narrowly
that the Tax Court didn't understand what its own rule meant.
That approach was surprising given the high level of deference
traditionally accorded to courts' and agencies' constructions of
their own rules. See id. at 68-73 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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Most arguments in and based on Swallows can be
winnowed down to three key pojnts, which, in my
opinion, make the case for reversal quite strong.
(1) Every tribunal - the BTA. the Tax Court, and the
Fourth Circuit - that previously }'Onsidered the question
held that some timing requirement regarding the filing of
returns is implied by the governing statute. Therefore,
the only question is line-drawing: where to draw the line
behveen permissible and impermissible tardiness.
(2) Since neither the statute itself nor its legislative
history addresses where to draw the line, Congress left a
gap to .be filled. Line-drawing under an explicit or
implicit delegation is a job for an administrative agency,
not for a court. The Supreme Court has taught this
regarding administrative law generally, and section
7805(a) confirms it regarding tax specifically.
(3) The bright line drawn by the regulation better
advances Congress's pwpose than di d the uncertain
timing possibilities suggested by earlier cases. ·me regulation was prospective, and it gives taxpayers an 18month period . Deductions are not forfeited simply because a return is filed after its due date. They are lost only
if the return is filed more than ns years after the due

date, and even this time limit can be waived in appropriate sjtuations. Allowing a Ph -year period is hardly
· draconian, excessively burdensome, or unreasonable.
Those three points being so, it is hard to see the
regulation being invalidated under any standard that
genuinely can be called deference, whether it be National
Muffler, Cltevron, or anything else. In dissent, Judge ,
Holmes wrote: "Uph olding this regulation should be
almost trivially easy."177 He was, and is, right.

..

9 '

177

126 T.C. at 162.
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